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INTRODUCTION
The most significant feature of the State's Brief is what it does not say. The State
does not and cannot cite one single reported case from Utah or any other jurisdiction where
journalists, gathering news, have ever been subject to prosecution for contributing to the
delinquency of minors. Nor has our research discovered such a case.1 The unprecedented
nature of this prosecution under the vague language of Utah Code Ann. § 78-3a-801(l)(a)(ii),
forcefully underscores the unforseeability and unfairness of these charges and the danger and
reality of arbitrary and improperly motivated application.

1

Moreover, we can find no reported case where a theatre, television, motion picture
or print media company has been charged with contributing based on its depiction of minors
using tobacco. Nor can we find any reported case charging tobacco companies with
contributing, despite evidence of advertising targeted at minors and allegations that such
advertising significantly increased minors5 use of certain tobacco products. Cf Maghini v.
R. J. Reynolds. 875 P.2d 73, 75 (Cal. 1994) (allegation that "the Old Joe Camel advertising
campaign targets minors for the purpose of inducing and increasing their illegal purchases
of cigarettes"), cert, denied 513 U.S. 1016 (1994).
If these types of purely commercial "encouragements" of minor tobacco use have not
been the subject of contributing prosecutions, it is remarkable, unpredictable and bizarre for
journalists attempting to cover an important public health story to be subject to such a
prosecution.
1

I.

THE COURTS, NOT A JURY, DECIDE WHETHER THE ALLEGED
CONDUCT, IF PROVEN, WOULD CONSTITUTE THE CHARGED
OFFENSE AND, IF SO, WHETHER SUCH AN APPLICATION OF
THE STATUTE WOULD BE CONSTITUTIONAL
The State begins its Brief with an irrelevant point: Juries determine facts. State Brief

at 9-10. It is irrelevant because, for purposes of their motion to dismiss in the district court
and on this appeal, defendants have assumed the State's version of events and have argued
that, assuming those facts, these charges must be dismissed as a matter of law. The State
opposed defendants' motion on the merits; it did not cross appeal from that portion of the
district court's ruling holding, as a matter of law, that defendants could not be prosecuted
under Utah Code Ann. § 78-3a-801(l)(a)(i); it did not object to defendants' petition for
interlocutory appeal; and it accepted defendants' statement of issues on appeal and of the
applicable standard of review. See State Brief at 1.
Assuming the State's version of the facts, the issue here is whether as a matter of law,
those facts, if proven at trial would constitute the offense of tending "to cause minors to
become or remain delinquent" under § 78-3a-801(l)(a)(ii), and, if so, would the application
of the statute be constitutional. These legal and constitutional issues are issues for the courts,
not a jury. See, e ^ , Stephens v. Bonneville Travel. Inc.. 935 P.2d 518, 519 (Utah 1997)
("Because both parties stipulated to the facts for purposes of the motion for summary
judgment and this appeal, there are no issues of material fact. The only issue before us is

2

solely a question of law . . ."). 2 The State's discussion of and quotations from the Harris.
Lawrence and Green cases (State Brief at 9-10) have no relevance to the issues on this
appeal.3
II.

DEFENDANTS DID NOTHING TO ENCOURAGE THE HIGH
SCHOOL STUDENTS' POSSESSION OF TOBACCO NOR TO
PROLONG THEIR POSSESSION OF TOBACCO
Judge Bryner correctly held, and the State has not appealed from his ruling that:
The gist of the offense [the students committed] lies in the
"possessing" of the substance [i.e., chewing tobacco].

. . . [D]efendant[s] did not commit the offense stated in [Utah
Code Ann.§ 78-3a-801(l)(a)(i)] for the reason that the offense
of possession of tobacco had already been committed by the
students and was in the process of being committed when the
students were approached by the defendants].

2

Accord State v. Wacek. 703 P.2d 296, 297-98 (Utah 1985) (defendant who was
convicted on stipulated facts appropriately challenged conviction upon claim that statute
under which he was convicted was unconstitutional); Cannon v. McDonald. 615 P.2d 1268
(Utah 1980) (after trial on stipulated facts, only issue on appeal is legal question of whether
trial court properly interpreted statute at issue); Hardy v. Beneficial Life Insurance Company.
787 P.2d 1, 2 (Utah App. 1990) (when parties have stipulated to facts, appellate court
addresses purely legal issues), cert, denied. 795 P.2d 1138 (Utah 1990).
3

State v. Harris. 264 P.2d 284 (Utah 1953); State v. Lawrence. 234 P.2d 600 (Utah
1951), and State v. Green. 6 P.2d 177 (Utah 1931), all were cases where the Supreme Court
reversed criminal convictions because the trial courts, through comments on the evidence or
jury instructions, improperly found facts against the defendants or took issues away from the
jury.
3

R. at 139-40 (emphasis supplied.)4
Judge Bryner went on, however, to state that defendants might be found guilty of
violating subsection (a)(ii) of the statute, based on the following reasoning:
Because the fact-finder could find that the defendants] asked
the students to chew tobacco on camera that was already in the
students' possession, the fact-finder could also find that the
defendants prolonged the time during which the students
were committing an ongoing offense, and that by
prolonging the period of unlawful possession of tobacco the
defendants] tended to cause uminors to remain delinquent"
in violation of 78-3a-801(l)(a)(ii).
R. at 140 (emphasis supplied.)
With all due respect to Judge Bryner, this reasoning is flawed.

The students'

"ongoing offense" was possession of chewing tobacco. In no logical or legal sense can
defendants' alleged request that the students chew some of the tobacco in their possession
at a particular point in time during the lunch hour on February 18, 1997, be viewed as
"prolonging" the period the students were in possession of the tobacco. The State does not
and cannot suggest that, if they had not been interviewed by defendants, the students would
4

The State's failure to file a cross-appeal precludes it from challenging Judge
Bryner's ruling on this issue. In re Estate of Lewis. 738 P.2d 617, 623 (Utah 1987)
(respondent precluded from seeking affirmative relief by failure to timely file
cross-appeal); Halliday v. Cluff. 739 P.2d 643, 645 (Utah App. 1987) ('"Absent a
cross-appeal, the [respondent] may not attack the judgment of the court below with a view
to enlarging its own rights or lessening the rights of its adversary.'") (citing Mann v.
Oppenheimer & Co.. 517 A.2d 1056, 1060 (Del. Supr. 1986)), cert, denied. 765 P.2d 1277
(Utah 1987).
4

have discarded the tobacco already in their possession.5 Indeed, one could as easily argue
that the alleged conduct of defendants — asking the students to chew some of the tobacco in
their possession on camera ~ might have shortened the period of their possession. The
students already possessed some amount of tobacco. Nothing defendants are alleged to have
done caused the students to possess that amount or to buy any more. The facts that they were
depicted on the evening television news using the tobacco they already possessed and, as a
result, charged with possession, may have discouraged them from buying or using additional
amounts of tobacco. In no meaningful way, however, can it be said that defendants' alleged
conduct "prolonged" the period of time of the students' possession.6
The State quotes Judge Bryner's reasoning. But nowhere in its Brief does the State
try to defend it.7 That reasoning is illogical and unsupportable; a conviction based on such
5

In fact, the students interviewed stated on camera that despite the dangers of chewing
tobacco — dangers dramatized for the students by an anti-tobacco assembly less than an hour
earlier — they had no intention of quitting. See "Quit Dippin'" (KTVX, Channel 4, television
broadcast, February 18, 1997), a true and correct videotaped copy of which was submitted
to the district court and is included in the record on appeal. R. at 134, 331.
6

As we noted in our opening Brief, some could assert that news media coverage of
unlawful conduct, in the minds of some engaged in such conduct, may be perceived as
encouraging. However, reporters covering these stories, constitutionally and legally, cannot
be held liable "even if, in some circumstances, [media coverage] incidentally glamorizes and
thereby indirectly promotes such conduct." Rice v. Paladin Enterprises, Inc.. 128 F.3d 233,
266 (4th Cir. 1997), cert, denied 118 S. Ct. 1515 (1998).
7

In its Brief, the State relies heavily on the fact that one of the defendants, Mr.
Krueger, was offered a pinch of chewing tobacco by one of the students and accepted it. Mr.
5

a contorted and unpredictable construction of the statute could not stand.
III.

AS A MATTER OF LAW, DEFENDANTS DID NOT HAVE THE
MENTAL STATE REQUIRED TO VIOLATE THE STATUTE
In the district court, the State stipulated that, to obtain a conviction, it must prove

defendants acted knowingly or intentionally.8 R. at 153, p. 4. In our opening Brief, we
demonstrate that, as a matter of law, journalists covering unlawful conduct which participants
already are predisposed to commit, cannot be found to have acted with the requisite mens rea
to support a conviction for aiding, abetting or contributing to the unlawful conduct. See
Opening Brief at 11-16. In response, the State says only this:
. . . there is little question that the appellants knew that
possession of tobacco by a minor was illegal, and any
reasonable person would know that encouraging a minor to
chew tobacco, for whatever reason, was contributing to that
minor's continued delinquency, that is, the possession of the
tobacco.
Krueger acknowledges that this was poor judgment on his part. However, it is not a crime.
Obviously, it is not unlawful for an adult to use tobacco in the presence of minors. The State
cites no case, and we have found none, holding it a crime for an adult to accept tobacco from
a minor. That this is a legally irrelevant make-weight is demonstrated, first, by the fact that
the State did not even mention this event in the Informations; and, second, by the fact that
Judge Bryner made no mention of it in his ruling.
Finally, Mr. Krueger's acceptance of a pinch of tobacco lends no support whatsoever
to the charges against Ms. Sawyer.
8

The State's quotation of the plurality opinion of Justice Crockett and District Judge
Snow in State v. Tritt 463 P.2d 806 (Utah 1970), construing former Utah Code Ann. §76-120, (State Brief at 12), is irrelevant to the mens rea issue here because the State has stipulated
that, under current law, a conviction requires intentional or knowing conduct.
6

State Brief at 12 (emphasis supplied).
Like the district court's "prolongation" argument, this argument makes no sense.
Asking a 17 year old high school student already in possession of tobacco, who is a longtime tobacco user and admittedly predisposed to use tobacco, to chew at a particular point
in time so that the conduct can be captured on camera in no logical way encourages the
students to continue the possession of tobacco. The offense of possession is committed
whether the tobacco is in the minor's pocket or in his mouth.
IV.

APPLICATION OF UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-3a-801(l)(a)(ii) TO THE
ALLEGED CONDUCT WOULD BE UNCONSTITUTIONAL
A.

The Statute, as Applied, Is Unconstitutionally Vague

As a statutory matter, two critical requirements of Utah criminal law are: to define
adequately the conduct and mental state which constitute each offense and safeguard conduct
that is without fault from condemnation as criminal; and to prevent arbitrary and oppressive
treatment of persons accused of crime. Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-104.
These statutory requirements spring from fundamental due process and free speech
principles:
Vague laws in any area suffer a constitutional infirmity. When
First Amendment rights are involved, we look even more
closely lest, under the guise of regulating conduct that is
reachable by the police power, freedom of speech and of the
press suffer.

7

Ashton v. Kentucky. 384 U.S. 195, 200-01 (1966).9
The unprecedented prosecution of defendants here under the uncertain phrase
"tends to cause minors to . . . remain delinquent," fails the due process specificity
requirement

and, a fortiori, fails the demand for "precision" imposed by the First

Amendment. See Entertainment Ventures, Inc. v. Brewer. 306 F. Supp. 802, 818-20 (M.D.
Ala. 1969) (3 judge court).10
B.

State v. Tritt Does Not Support the Constitutionality of the Statute

As shown in our opening brief and immediately above, the uncertain language of Utah
Code Ann. § 78-3a-801(l)(a)(ii) — "tends to cause minors to become or remain delinquent"
— is unconstitutionally vague as applied here in light of the First Amendment interests
involved.
9

The State's citation of the majority opinion in the Supreme Court's 5-4 decision in
Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 501 U.S. 663 (1991), is unavailing. Cohen was a private civil
dispute between journalists and their source; it involved no issue of either vagueness or mens
rea.
10

The State's halfhearted attempt to distinguish Entertainment Ventures fails. The
Entertainment Ventures court held that the Alabama contributing statute could not be applied
to the exhibition of a motion picture for vagueness reasons despite the fact that, in Ginsberg
v. New York. 390 U.S. 629 (1968), the Supreme Court had upheld a statute prohibiting
distribution of materials "harmful to minors", which did not meet the definition of obscenity
as to adults.
Holding defendants here criminally liable for tending to cause minors "to remain
delinquent" based upon the logically insupportable notion of "prolonging possession" suffers
from vagueness, imprecision and unforseeability to an even greater extent than did the
attempted contributing prosecution in Entertainment Ventures.
8

As noted, the State's inability to cite a single reported case from Utah or anywhere
else where journalists have been prosecuted for contributing underscores the unforseeability
of this prosecution and the danger of arbitrary and improperly motivated prosecution.
In response, the State can cite only the two-judge plurality opinion in State v. Tritt
463 P.2d 806 (Utah 1970). That opinion, authored by Justice Crockett and joined in only by
District Judge Snow, sitting by designation, provides little help to the State.
In Tritt. a physician was convicted of contributing to the delinquency of a minor for
knowingly prescribing for the minor excessive quantities of amphetamines and barbiturates
and for aiding and encouraging the minor to use a false name in procuring the drugs. 463
P.2d at 807. In neither the trial court nor on appeal, did Dr. Tritt raise a vagueness challenge
to the statute. Rather, the only issue he raised on appeal was the claim that the State had not
proven criminal intent by showing Dr. Tritt knew his patient was a minor and/or that he was
using a false name to procure the drugs. LL There was no dispute that, at trial, the State had
proven that the amount of drugs prescribed by Dr. Tritt were "greatly in excess of any
possible proper usage . . . . " Id.
Since Dr. Tritt had raised no vagueness challenge, the discussion of that issue in
Justice Crockett's opinion, quoted by the State, is simply dicta. See id, at 808 ("the
defendant did not raise the issue as to the validity of the statute, either in the court below or
in this court; and therefore we can see no justification for dealing with that issue.") Further,
9

Justice Crockett's plurality opinion conceded that there may be applications of the statute
which would be unconstitutional, idL at 809, but concluded that "the conduct here charged
[i.e., knowingly prescribing excessive amounts of dangerous drugs] would amount to the
commission of a crime, which by any definition whatsoever, constitutes contributing to the
delinquency of an minor." I&
Only two of the five judges hearing Dr. Tritt's appeal joined Justice Crockett's
opinion. Justice Ellett voted to affirm the conviction, but did not join in Justice Crockett's
reasoning or his dicta regarding vagueness. Justice Ellett's concurrence was limited "to the
fact that the defendant prescribed an inordinant amount of depressant and stimulating drugs."
Id. Justices Tuckett and Callister dissented and would have reversed the conviction on the
grounds that Utah's contributing statute then in effect, when not tied to encouraging a minor
to violate a law, was unconstitutionally vague. IdL, at 810-811:
The offense of contributing to the delinquency of a minor was
unknown to the common law and exists now only by reason of
statutory provisions dealing with the subject.
Without a statutory definition of the terms,
"delinquency," or "delinquent," Section 55-10-80, U.C.A.
1953, as amended, is subject to challenge on constitutional
grounds for vagueness and because of that defect, fails to define
a criminal offense, with the exception of that part of the statute
which makes inducing, aiding or encouraging a child to violate
a law an offense under the section above referred to. Our
attention has not been directed to any decision of this court
which defines the terms, "delinquent," "delinquency" or
10

"delinquent child," without the aid of a statute, nor do we find
other statutory definitions with the exception of Section 76-42-5,
U.C.A.1953, as amended, which deals with the purchase or
possession of tobacco by minors.
463 P.2d at 810 (Tuckett & Callister, J.J., dissenting).
The prosecutions here, under subsection (ii) of 78-3a-801(l)(a) suffer from the same
vagueness vice. Subsection (i) of the statute provides some guidance because a conviction
requires proof of conduct which encourages minors "in the violation of any federal, state,
or local law, or municipal ordinance." However, Judge Bryner, correctly held that
defendants could not be prosecuted under subsection (i) because defendants did nothing to
encourage the students' violation of Utah's current possession law, Utah Code Ann. § 76-10105.
In Tritt. three active members of the Utah Supreme Court refused to join in Justice
Crockett's opinion, relied on by the State. Justice Ellett voted to affirm the conviction, but
only because Dr. Tritt clearly and knowingly had facilitated the possession of "inordinant"
quantities of dangerous drugs, by writing the prescriptions. The dicta in Justice Crockett's
opinion in Tritt. joined only by District Judge Snow, is not Utah law.
Moreover, this case, factually, is very different. First, Tritt implicated no First
Amendment concerns. Second, Dr. Tritt, indisputably, clearly and directly facilitated the
minor's possession of inordinate quantities dangerous prescription drugs; he wrote the

11

prescriptions. Here, defendants did nothing to contribute to the students' possession of
tobacco; they already had it. The students' violation of state law was complete before
defendants came upon the scene.

Judge Bryner's view that defendants somehow

"prolonged" the students' possession of tobacco makes no sense, logically or legally; and no
reasonable person would understand that asking an admitted habitual user of tobacco to
chew some tobacco already in the user's possession for purposes of obtaining some video
tape for a news story would or could be construed as "prolonging" the period of the students'
possession.
Judge Bryner correctly held that defendants cannot be prosecuted under subsection
(a)(i), of the statute, the only relevant part of the statute tied to a minor's violation of law.
Without that mooring to a reference to violation of law by the minors, subsection (a)(ii) is
unconstitutionally vague, see Tritt 463 P.2d at 809-811 (Tuckett & Callister, J.J., dissenting)
particularly so as applied here to First Amendment protected activities. Entertainment
Ventures. 306 F. Supp. at 818-20.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons above and those in our opening Brief, the Informations must be
dismissed.
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